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Abstract
Voters assign a score to each of the many available alternatives. We study
the normative properties of procedures that aggregate the scores collected in
the ballot box. A vast class of aggregation procedures, including procedures
based on the pairwise comparison of alternatives, satisfy May’s famous condi-
tions in our framework. We prove that, within such a plethora of procedures,
scoring rules are singled out by a property related to their informational sim-
plicity: in order to determine the winner, they do not take into account the
specific distribution of scores chosen by each voter. The result is shown to hold
regardless of the introduction of asymmetry among the alternatives.
KEYWORDS: Scoring Rules, May’s Theorem, Informational Simplicity.
The design of voting procedures has attracted a considerable interest both in
positive political theory and social choice theory. The simplest situation one could
possibly conceive is the choice among two alternatives. In such a binary setting, the
fairest solution seems to be majority voting as this is the only voting procedure
that satisfies the compelling conditions proposed by May (1952) [23]. Majority vot-
ing is a well defined voting procedure for any profile of announcements over the two
alternatives (Universal Domain), it treats the voters (Anonymity) and the alterna-
tives (Neutrality) symmetrically and if some voters change their vote in favor of one
alternative the outcome of the election changes accordingly (Positive Responsive-
ness).
If the choice among three or more alternatives is at stake, things become con-
siderably more complicated. Still, the most natural solution seems to be plurality
voting, namely, given the preference ordering over the alternatives of each voter,
choose the alternative that is ranked first by the largest number of them. However,
∗This work has benefited from useful discussions with Ani Guerdjikova, Se´bastien Courtin,
Jean-Franc¸ois Laslier, Franc¸ois Maniquet, Mathieu Martin, Vincent Merlin, Marcus Pivato, Kaj
Thomsson and seminar participants at CORE.
†CNRS and Universite´ de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA, F-95000 Cergy-Pontoise, France. Email:
matias.nunez@u-cergy.fr.
‡Maastricht University, Netherlands - Email: g.valletta@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
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as it is well-known, this rule has a number of serious drawbacks. For instance, it
can lead to the choice of an alternative that ranks very low in the preferences of the
voters as early noticed both by Condorcet and Borda. They proposed two distinct
solutions that were meant to (partially) solve this problem. The former suggested
that the alternative defeating every other alternative in pairwise comparisons (the
Condorcet Winner), if it exists, should be the winner of the election. The latter
proposed the Borda count: each alternative receives a score which equals its rank-
ing in the ordering and the winner of the election is the alternative who collects the
highest total score. These two ideas provide the underpinnings for the two most
extensively studied families of voting procedures: Condorcet procedures (based on
the pairwise comparisons of alternatives) and scoring rules. Scoring rules are simple
and widely used voting procedures. A voter assigns a certain number of points to
each of the alternatives and those which obtain the highest total score (i.e. the sum
of points) are the winners of the election1.
In order to merely formulate the aforementioned weakness of plurality voting
(and to fix it), one has to refer to voters’ preference orderings. Indeed most of the
literature in social choice theory assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that when voters
cast their ballot, they have to report their preference ordering over the available
alternatives.2 This need not be the case in real-life elections. The amount of infor-
mation asked to each voter depends on the voting procedure. For example, under
plurality voting, voters are asked to reveal their “first choice” whereas under the
Borda rule they have to provide much more information. Moreover, even if two
voting procedures ask to the voters the same information they do not necessarily
use the same amount of it in order to determine the winner. Indeed, both the Borda
Rule and the Condorcet Rule collect the same amount of information from the vot-
ers but they use a different amount of it: the former just considers the total score
received by each alternative and the latter hinges, for each couple of alternative, on
the relative score assigned by each voter.
In order to better understand the informational basis of voting procedures3 one
1Scoring rules differ according to which range of points voters are allowed to assign to different
alternatives. For instance, plurality and approval voting (in which a voter can assign one point to
as many alternatives as she wishes) are both scoring rules.
2One has to refer to voters’ preference orderings. Indeed most of the literature in social choice
theory assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that when voters cast their ballot, they have to report their
preference ordering over the available alternatives.This is in fact behind the plethora of negative
results we can find in such a literature. Arrow’s (1951) [2] General Possibility theorem and the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on strategic manipulability (Gibbard (1973) [14]; Satterthwaite
(1975) [30]) stand among the most influential results. A recent stream of the literature focuses on the
desirability of manipulability of voting procedures (see for example Dowding and van Hees (2008)
[11]). Again, the basic input of such studies is the voters’ preference orderings. Considerations
about the manipulability of a voting procedure are beyond the scope of our paper.
3The literature on the informational basis of the measurement of individual welfare and their
relation with the measure of collective welfare, the so-called informational basis of social choice
(Sen (1970) [32], d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) [10] and Fleurbaey (1993) [13]), is very large.
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could think of them as consisting of two parts. The first one defines the amount
of information one should ask to the voters, the balloting problem. The second one,
determines how to use such an information in order to designate the winner(s),
the aggregation problem4. The objective of the balloting problem is to devise the
ideal shape of the balloting procedure of an election. The aim of the aggregation
problem5, is to single out a desirable aggregation procedure given the information
available.
Among the properties that define the desirability of an aggregation procedure,
one should consider its informational simplicity. That is, the difference between
the amount of information deriving from the balloting procedure and the amount
actually used by the aggregation procedure. For instance, as explained earlier, the
Borda and the Condorcet rule differ from the informational simplicity point of view.
We provide a characterization of the entire family of scoring rules based on their
informational simplicity. Within a vast family of voting procedures scoring rules
are the only ones that look at the information contained in the ballot box in its
entirety neglecting the fact that a score assigned to an alternative belongs to a
specific distribution of scores chosen by each voter.
In order to make as clear as possible the distinction between the amount of infor-
mation collected by a voting procedure and amount actually used we only focus on
the normative properties of the aggregation procedure, taking as given the balloting
procedure. To the best of our knowledge the only paper that follows the same route
is Goodin and List (2006) [17]. The authors provide an interesting generalization
of May’s theorem to many-option decisions provided that the balloting procedure
collects only one vote (her revealed first-choice) from each voter (instead of asking
her the full preference ordering over the alternatives). Their work stands out as
a “conditional defense” of plurality voting, conditional to the limited amount of
information asked to the voters by the balloting procedure.
We follow a similar line of reasoning but we move a step further by considering
a wider family of balloting procedures. We do so by allowing each voter to cast
several ballots, each ballot standing for one alternative. The amount of ballots that
Surprisingly there is not a counterpart of such a literature in voting theory.
4Such a distinction is seldom made in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, one of the
first works which emphasized the importance of such a distinction is Merril and Nagel (1987) [25]
where it is argued that “in the recent literature, the conflation of balloting method and decision
rule through the phrase “plurality method” has become a source of confusion not just in language
but also in thinking.”
5One should notice that different aggregation procedures can be associated to the same balloting
procedure. For example full-preference balloting can be used by assuming that the winner of the
election is the alternative with the highest sum of votes or the one with at least 2/3 of the votes.
On the contrary, the same aggregation procedure can be based on different balloting procedure.
For example, declaring as winner(s) the alternative(s) with the most votes can be defined on single
vote balloting (and this is typically happens in real world situations where voters are asked to vote
for one alternative only) or full-preference balloting (for instance Borda balloting).
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each voter can cast for each alternative depends on the balloting procedure chosen6.
Practically speaking, each voter can assign a score to each of the alternatives (each
score being a positive integer). This particular way of representing balloting proce-
dures is fully general and it just simplifies the definition the normative properties
bearing on the aggregation procedures.
We start our analysis focusing on the conditions proposed by May. To do so, we
adapt them to our framework, a score-based informational environment with many
alternatives, keeping unaltered their normative appeal. Not surprisingly, in such
a framework, these conditions are not particularly restrictive: many aggregation
procedures satisfy them. For example, both procedures based on the sum of scores,
like approval voting and the Borda rule, and Condorcet procedures, such as the
Black or the Copeland procedure, satisfy these conditions. But if we strengthen
Anonymity in such a way that the information about the combination of ballots cast
by a voter (and not only her identity) is not relevant for the aggregation procedure
then we are only left with aggregation procedures based on the sum of the scores,
the scoring rules. That is, choosing the option(s) that has collected the highest
number of ballots in the ballot box is the only desirable aggregation procedure.
Our result has two interpretations of particular interest.
First, we provide a characterization of scoring rules that relies on a condition that
describes their informational simplicity. This condition is behind a property often
used in strategic voting theory as it greatly simplifies the analysis of the electoral
game: the specific composition of the message sent by each voter is a negligible
piece of information as in order to determine the winner, we do not need to know
the ballots cast by each voter, we only need to know their sum7. For a considerably
wide range of informational environments (balloting procedures) if one wants an
aggregation procedure that complies with such a simplicity and with the remaining
May’s conditions, then using a scoring rule is the only available option.
Second, our result allows to trace the line that separates, in terms of informa-
tional simplicity, aggregation procedures that are solely based on the sum of scores
from aggregation procedures that are based on the pairwise comparison of the al-
ternatives. Such a line is indeed represented by the fact that, again, scoring rules
are the unique procedures that consider anonymously the ballots cast by each voter
(in a framework where each voter can cast more than one ballot) and not only the
voters.
We also use our informational simplicity argument in favor of scoring rules in
6For example, under approval balloting a voter might decide to approve as many candidates as
she wishes by putting one ballot for each of them in the ballot box. Under Borda balloting the
score that a voter assigns to each alternative is equal to the number of ballots she introduces for
that specific alternative.
7See Palfrey (1989) [28] and Myerson and Weber (1993) [27] for applications in political science.
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situations where there is some normatively admissible asymmetry among the alter-
natives. In a framework where only two alternatives are available Houy (2007) [19]
provides an interesting characterization of the qualified majority rule. According to
this rule, in order to choose one of the two alternatives, a certain ratio of voters has
to support it. Moreover this rule still satisfies Universal Domain, Anonymity and
Positive Responsiveness (but obviously fails to satisfy Neutrality). Houy actually
proves that the majority rule is characterized by the previous axioms together with
two further requirements. The first one is General Abstention according to which
if no voter shows up the day of the election then all alternatives win. The second
one is Coalition Permanency, the intuition of which is as follows: if a group of ab-
stainers can affect, by voting in a certain way, the outcome of the election, they can
do so independently of what the other voters do. We prove that, in our framework,
choosing the option whose weighted sum of scores is the highest one (according to
a given vector of weights) is the only aggregation procedure that satisfies the five
conditions just mentioned.
After providing a short survey of the literature, we describe our setting. We
then provide a formal definition of May’s axioms in our framework and then we
provide a novel characterization of scoring rules. The discussion on the consequences
of a weakening of the Neutrality condition and the characterization of weighted
scoring rules are relegated to the last section of the paper, prior to the concluding
remarks. Most of the technical proofs can be found in the Appendix together with
a short analysis of how aggregation procedures based on the pairwise comparison of
alternatives can be defined in our informational environment.
Review of the Literature
May’s theorem stands among the few positive results within the literature on voting
procedures in which impossibility results abound8. In particular, in elections with
many alternatives, the difficulty of finding positive results is overwhelming as far as
incentives for truth-telling are concerned.
Nonetheless, there are still many studies that, leaving incentives aside, focus on
the normative properties of voting procedures, when society has to decide among
more than two alternatives. One reason to justify the interest in such properties is
that the impossibility results “tell us much about what cannot be done, but leave[s]
open the problem of defining what can be done”, as Young (1975) [35] puts it.
Scoring rules are a class of voting procedure that has attracted particular interest.
The most significant advantage of using scoring rules is probably that they are, in
8For recent treatments, see Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) [5] and Mccarty and Meirowitz
(2006) [24].
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general, quite simple to understand. This also explains why they are widely used in
real world procedures9.
Simple majority rule can be considered as the simplest scoring rule. Several
works provide characterization results that are alternative to May’s theorem10.
Other works focus on scoring rules in general. Classical axiomatizations of scor-
ing rules (Smith (1973) [33] and Young (1975) [35]) uniquely consider scoring rules
in which a voter can express only a rank ordering of the alternatives. Myerson
(1995) [26] drops the ordering assumption and then introduces the notion of gener-
alized scoring rules. Approval voting stands out as the most-well known generalized
scoring rule which does not satisfy the ordering condition. More recently, Gilboa
and Schmeidler (2001, 2003) [15, 16] in the context of choice theory provides a more
general characterization of scoring rules in which the Neutrality axiom is weakened
to the one of Diversity (a condition that ensures the existence of a diverse enough
number of scores for the voter)11.
All the works mentioned so far do not make any distinction between the bal-
loting procedure and the aggregation procedure. They rather focus on the whole
voting procedure with the consequence that the analysis of the informational basis
of voting is typically neglected. Importantly, the analysis of Goodin and List (2006)
[17] provides a remarkable example of the fact that the normative analysis of an ag-
gregation procedure is affected by the informational structure on which the voting
procedure is founded12. Our contribution continues along this direction.
The setting
The set N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of voters while A = {a1, . . . , ak} is the set of
alternatives.
A ballot is a device13 used to record choices made by voters. In our model, voters
9Canada, United Kingdom and United States are, among many others, the most significative
examples of countries that still use plurality voting in legislatives elections. approval voting is used
by the United Nations General Assembly and several prominent scientific institutions. The Borda
Rule is widely used to determine the winner in sport competitions. It is as well used by several
scientific institutions and to elect two of the ninety members of the Slovenian National Assembly
10See Asan and Sanver (2002) [3], Campbell (1988) [6], Campbell and Kelly (2000) [7]), Cantillon
and Rangel (2000) [8], Maskin (1995) [21] and Woeginger (2003) [34]. On a related work, Asan and
Sanver (2006) [4] have characterized absolute qualified majority rules in a two-alternatives setting
in which Positive Responsiveness is replaced by Maskin Monotonicity.
11See Pivato (2011) [29] for a recent work dealing with the roles of Reinforcement and Neutrality in
Myerson’s framework and Chebotarev and Shamis (1998) [9] for a survey of forty characterizations
of scoring rules.
12In a recent work, Apesteguia, Ballester and Ferrer (2011) [1] provide a different approach the
does not fall in any of the previous categories. The provide an endorsement for scoring rules, by
proving that these are the voting procedures that perform best in terms of certain cardinal ideals
of justice such as utilitarianism, maximin and maximax.
13The term derives from the method used in the seventeenth century to decide the admission
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express their opinion through a ballot. Each ballot has on it the name of at most
one of the available alternatives. More formally, a ballot is a vector of dimension |K|
such that (only) one of its elements14 is equal to 1 and all the others are equal to 0.
Voters can choose to cast one or more ballots depending on the balloting procedure.
A balloting procedure is the set of possible combinations of ballots that a voter is
allowed to choose. Each voter can choose one of such combinations. So, for example,
if |A| = 3, under plurality balloting we have
Bp = {( 1 0 0 ); ( 0 1 0 ); ( 0 0 1 )},
whereas under approval balloting, the allowed combinations are as follows:
Ba =

 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 ;
 0 1 00 0 0
0 0 0
 ;
 0 0 10 0 0
0 0 0
 ;
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
 ;
 1 0 00 0 1
0 0 0
 ;
 0 1 00 0 1
0 0 0
 ;
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1


More generally, a balloting procedure is a set of matrices of dimension |A| × c
where c is an integer describing the number of ballots that each voter is allowed to
cast given the balloting procedure (for example, under plurality balloting c = 1).
We consider that the balloting procedure is given and common knowledge to both
the voters and the social planner. Even though this is not the only way to represent
this class of balloting procedures, the representation we have chosen simplifies the
presentation of our axioms.
The vote of each voter i ∈ N is denoted by vi, it simply consists of choosing one
(and only one) element from the set specified by the balloting procedure. So, in the
second example listed here, a voter who wants to approve of alternatives 1 and 2
of new members in many gentlemen’s clubs and similar institutions such as Freemasonry and
fraternities. Each voter was supplied with a black and a white ball and he could audibly cast
only one of them into the ballot box. The black ball stands as an objection to the admission of
the new member whilst the white one stands as a favorable vote. Once the voting procedure was
complete the box was opened and the balls displayed. The presence on just one black ball was
typically enough to refuse the admission of the new member (Schmidt and Babchuk.[31]).
14Our results would remain unaffected if we allowed voters to cast negative scores at the cost of
more cumbersome proofs. Furthermore, two scoring rules are identical iff there exists a bijective
affine transformation between each of their scores. Hence, any scoring rule including negative scores
is equivalent to a scoring rule with positive scores. In what follows, Q+ stands for the set of non-
negative rational numbers whereas N+ and R+ respectively denote the sets of non-negative integers
and non-negative real numbers.
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would choose the fourth element in Ba. This amounts to say that she would insert
three ballots in the ballot box, one with the name of alternative 1 on it, the other
one with the name of alternative 2 on it and a third one with no name on it. A
voter i ∈ N abstains if she throws in the ballot box c ballots with no name on it.
A vote distribution v represents the list of different choices, given the balloting
procedure, made by all the voters taking part to the election. Namely v = (vi)i∈N .
By construction v is a matrix composed of |A| columns and |N |c rows. Each of
these rows is a ballot cast by some voter so that it has at most one element equal
to 1 and all the others equal to 0. Practically speaking v is the ballot box that
contains all the ballots the day of the election. For the ease of the exposition we
denote with N the set of ballots inside the ballot box. Clearly |N | = |N |c. Each
entry of the vote distribution is denoted by vqj where q ∈ N denotes one of the rows
of the matrix and j, associated with the alternative aj ∈ A, denotes one of the |A|
columns. Let v0 denote the vote distribution where every voter decides to abstain.
Finally, let V denote the set of all conceivable vote distributions complying with
a given balloting procedure. Indeed, the set of vote distributions depends on the
given balloting procedure, nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, we have decided
not to make explicit this dependency on the notation.
An aggregation procedure W : V ⇒ A associates every vote distribution v ∈ V
to a nonempty subset of A.
For each aj ∈ A, we write aj ∈W (v) to denote the fact that such an alternative
is in the winning set at the voting distribution v ∈ V . The winner could be unique
or there could be several alternatives that are tied.
For all v ∈ V , let the vector s(v) = (sa1(v), sa2(v), . . . , sak(v)) =
∑n
i=1 vi denote
the score vector. Namely, the vector s(v) lists, for each alternative, the total number
of ballots, in the ballot box, that stand for that alternative. Finally, let S(V ) denote
the set of all possible scoring vectors.
May’s Axioms
In what follows, we propose an adaptation of the four conditions proposed by May
(1952) [23] to our setting.
May’s first condition deals with the richness of the domain of the whole voting
procedure. Here we rather impose a condition about the richness of the domain of
the aggregation procedure. More precisely we impose no restriction on the set of
vote distributions: an aggregation procedure W has to determine a non-empty set
of winners for all possible vote distributions v ∈ V .
Universal Domain. The domain of W is the set of all possible vote distributions.
The second condition simply requires that the identity of the voters who has
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cast a certain set of ballots should be irrelevant for the aggregation procedure. Let
the mapping pi : N → N denote any of the possible permutations of the voters (that
is, any of the possible relabeling of the voters’ identity).
Anonymity. For all u, v ∈ V such that v = (upi(i))i∈N , W (u) = W (v).
We also propose a stronger version of the previous axiom. The idea is that not
only the identity of the voter should be irrelevant for the aggregation procedure.
Also the information about the combination of the ballots cast by each voter should
be irrelevant for the aggregation procedure. Namely, the fact that a voter has de-
cided to assign a certain score to a certain alternative and, at the same time, some
other score to some other alternative should be an irrelevant piece of information
for the aggregation procedure. If we restrict our attention to approval balloting this
correspond to what Goodin and List (2006)[17] call Optionwise Anonymity. In our
more general framework this idea boils down to the fact that the aggregation pro-
cedure should only look at the information deriving from a ballot box in which each
ballot brings a minimal amount of information (the name of one alternative solely)
and such information is absolutely independent from the information provided by
the other ballots even if they have been chosen by the same voter. Let the mapping
σ : N → N denote any of the possible permutations of the ballots in the ballot box
(or, to put it differently any of the possible permutations of the lines of the vote
distribution).
Ballot Anonymity. For all u, v ∈ V , such that v = σ(u), W (u) = W (v).
The next condition requires to give equal weight to the scores received by any
of the alternatives so that if the votes change in such a way that the scores are
permuted across alternatives, the outcome is permuted accordingly, i.e “the names
of the alternatives do not matter”. Let the mapping τ : A → A denote any of the
possible permutations of the alternatives (that is, any of the possible relabeling of
the alternatives’ identity).
Neutrality. For all u, v ∈ V such that v = τ(u), for all aj ∈ A, aj ∈ W (u) if
and only if aτ(j) ∈W (v).
Neutrality imposes quite some structure on the aggregation procedure and, as we
will be shown in the section dealing with qualified scoring rules, by relaxing it we
are able to characterize a considerably wider family of aggregation procedures.
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Before introducing the next condition, we need to define some notation. For all
u, v ∈ V and aj , ak ∈ A, u {ajak} v if and only if there exists a nonempty set of
ballots M ⊂ N such that
for allm ∈M, either umj > vmj , umk ≤ vmk and uml = vml for all l 6= j, k
or umj ≥ vmj , umk < vmk and uml = vml for all l 6= j, k
for allm′ 6∈M,um′ = vm′ .
If a vote distribution changes from v to u then we say that at the vote distribution
u the alternative aj dominates the alternative ak with respect to the vote distribution
v. Informally, u {ajak} v means that for at least one ballot either the score of option
aj increases while the score of some other option ak weakly decreases or the score
for option aj weakly increases while the score of ak decreases.
The next axiom requires that the aggregation procedure should be sensitive to
such changes of the vote distribution in a specific way. Assume that at some profile
v ∈ V some alternative aj ∈ A is tied or it is the only winner. Consider a change in
the way some voters vote so that we obtain a profile u ∈ V such that u {ajak} v, for
some ak ∈ A. Then, under the new profile option aj must still be a winner whereas
ak must not.
Positive Responsiveness. For all u, v ∈ V and aj , ak ∈ A such that aj ∈ W (v)
and u {ajak} v, aj ∈W (u) and ak /∈W (u).
Notice that our definition of Positive Responsiveness is slightly stronger than the
one proposed by Goodin and List (2006) [17] but it is closer to the one proposed by
May (1952) [23]. In the former paper, at the vote distribution u the alternative aj
dominates the alternative ak with respect to the vote distribution v, i.e. u {ajak} v,
if and only if some voters raise the score they assign to alternative aj and, at the
same time, they lower the score they give to some alternative ak, in other words
some voters switch their vote from one alternative to another one. May’s concept of
domination (like ours) allows, additionally, to consider other tie-breaking situations.
Indeed, some voters can also break a tie either because they go from abstention to
giving a certain score to some alternative(s) or because they go from giving a certain
score to some alternative(s) to abstention.
10
Scoring Rules
If only two alternatives are available May’s conditions characterize majority voting.
If there are more than two alternatives and voters are allowed to cast just one ballot
(plurality balloting), May’s conditions characterize plurality voting (as an aggrega-
tion procedure). If voters are allowed to cast more than one ballot (i.e., they are
allowed to attribute several scores to different alternatives) the class of aggregation
procedures that satisfy May’s conditions becomes considerably bigger. Let us con-
sider scoring rules first. An aggregation procedure W is a scoring rule if and only if
for all v ∈ V and each aj ∈ A,
aj ∈W (v) iff saj (v) ≥ sak(v) for all ak 6= aj .
It is quite easy to see that such an aggregation procedure satisfies all of May’s axioms
(as defined in the previous section). It satisfies Universal Domain by definition. It
satisfies Anonymity because the set of winners depends only on the sum of the votes
and not on the identity of the voters. In a similar fashion, it satisfies Neutrality
because the set of winners depends on the sum of the votes each alternative gets
and not on the name of the alternatives. Finally, it satisfies Positive Responsiveness
because if the score of a winning alternative aj is increased by some voters and the
score of some other alternative ak is decreased or remains unchanged then aj remains
a winning alternative whereas ak necessarily ends up with a score that is strictly
lower than aj so that for sure she is not part of the winning set. The argument is
the same if the score of aj remains unchanged and the score of ak decreases.
Is this the only aggregation procedure satisfying these axioms? No, it is not. Ac-
tually many procedures belonging to the family of procedures based on the pairwise
comparison of alternatives, if suitably defined in order to fit our framework, satisfy
the axioms we are considering. In our setting the pairwise comparison is based just
on the information contained in the ballots and not on the whole voters’ preferences
rankings. A formal definition, in our framework, of several aggregation procedures
based on the pairwise comparison of alternatives is provided in the Appendix.
It turns out that the strengthening Anonymity allows us to create a breach
between scoring rules and aggregation procedures based on the pairwise comparisons
of alternatives.
Theorem 1. An aggregation procedure satisfies Universal Domain, Ballot Anonymity,
Neutrality, and Positive Responsiveness if and only if is a scoring rule.
It is easy to see why a scoring rule satisfies Ballot Anonymity. The outcome of
the election solely depends on the total score that each alternative receives which
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ultimately depends on the total amount of ballots cast in favor of a certain option,
independently of those cast in favor of others. But this fact also explain why any
of the procedures based on the pairwise comparison of alternatives does not satisfy
Ballot Anonymity. Consider any two alternatives aj , ak ∈ A. In order to compare
these two alternatives we need to be able to know, for each voter, the score she
has given to aj and the score she has given to ak. That is, for each voter, the
information about combination of ballots she has cast is relevant for the aggregation
procedure. It is useful to stress that, if voters are allowed to cast at most one ballot
(i.e., plurality balloting), the distinction between these two families vanishes. In
fact, in this particular informational environment Anonymity and Ballot Anonymity
coincide. If more information is asked to the voters (as for example with approval
balloting and Borda balloting) then the role of Ballot Anonymity in shaping the
additive structure of the balloting procedure becomes essential as shown in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let an aggregation procedure W satisfy Ballot Anonymity. Then there
exists a T : S(V )⇒ A such that for all v ∈ V , W (v) = T (s(v)).
Proof. We need to prove that for all u, v ∈ V such that s(u) = s(v), W (u) = W (v).
To see this, it suffices to notice that s(u) = s(v) iff
∑|N |
q=1 uq =
∑|N |
q=1 vq. Moreover,
for each row of the vote distribution, q ∈ N , if we consider the vector uq, at most
one of its coordinates equals one whereas the rest of them equal zero (the same holds
for vq). Since by assumption
∑|N |
q=1 uq =
∑|N |
q=1 vq, we can define v as a permutation
of u, that is, v = σ(u). So, by Ballot Anonymity, W (u) = W (v). This implies that
the aggregation procedure W can be represented by some T such that for all v ∈ V ,
W (v) = T (s(v)).
Lemma 1 says that Ballot Anonymity forces us to summarize the information
contained in the ballot box in a very precise way: only the total scores each alterna-
tive has been assigned by the voters is relevant, all the extra information eventually
contained in the ballot box can be disregarded.
This also means, among other things, that we can restate some of the concepts
expressed so far in terms of sum of scores: for each aj , ak ∈ A, u {ajak} v if and
only if
saj (u) ≥ saj (v), sak(u) ≤ sak(v) and sal(u) = sal(v) for all al 6= aj , ak;
with at least one of the inequalities being strict. Moreover if an aggregation pro-
cedure W : V ⇒ A also satisfies Neutrality then, for any permutation τ of the
alternatives, for all aj ∈ A
aj ∈ T (s(v)) if and only if aτ(j) ∈ T (τ(s(v))), (1)
12
with W (v) = T (s(v)). These observations will be useful for the proof of the following
lemma which concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. Let an aggregation procedure W : V ⇒ A satisfy Universal Domain,
Ballot Anonymity, Neutrality and Positive Responsiveness. Then for all v ∈ V and
for all aj ∈ A, aj ∈W (v) iff saj (v) ≥ sak(v) for all ak 6= aj.
Proof. For some v ∈ V and some aj ∈ A, let aj ∈ W (v). By lemma 1, W (v) =
T (s(v)) so that aj ∈ T (s(v)). Assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists
some ak ∈ A such that saj (v) < sak(v). Let τ be the permutation that swaps
the votes obtained by alternatives aj and ak and leaves the other votes unchanged.
This permutation changes accordingly the vector of the total scores. By equation 1,
aτ(j) = ak ∈ T (τ(s(v))). Since by assumption saj (v) < sak(v) then, by construction
we also have τ(v) {ajak} v so that aj ∈ T (τ(s(v))) and ak /∈ T (τ(s(v))), the desired
contradiction. In order to prove the “only if” part, take any vote distribution v ∈ V
such that saj (v) ≥ sal(v) for all al 6= aj . Assume, by way of contradiction, that
aj /∈ T (s(v). As T (s(v)) = W (v) 6= ∅, there must exist some ak 6= aj such that
ak ∈ T (s(v)). Let τ denote again the permutation that swaps the votes obtained by
alternative aj and those obtained by alternative ak and leave unchanged the other
votes. By equation 1, aτ(j) = ak /∈ T (τ(s(v))). If saj (v) = sak(v), then s(v) =
τ(s(v)) and thus ak = aτ(j) /∈ T ((τ(s(v))) = T ((s(v)), a contradiction. If saj (v) >
sak(v) then, by construction, τ(v) {akaj} v so that, by Positive Responsiveness,
ak ∈ T (τ(s(v))) which yields, the desired contradiction.
Qualified Scoring Rules
In this section we study the consequences of a weakening of Neutrality. We are
confronted with a wider class of scoring rules in the sense that the aggregation pro-
cedure still works by adding the scores deriving from the balloting procedure but
these sums can have different weights in order to favor certain alternatives over oth-
ers. The scoring rules we have proposed in the previous section are just a subfamily
of such a family of rules where all the alternatives are treated symmetrically by the
aggregation procedure. Indeed the most studied rules such as plurality, Borda and
approval voting share the property of being neutral and focusing on voting rules
which are not neutral may seem unattractive at first thought. One can think for
example of legislative or presidential elections where naturally the alternatives are
entitled to receive the same treatment by the voting procedure. However there might
be cases where there is some normatively admissible asymmetry among the alter-
natives as such alternatives are intrinsically different. In such cases society might
agree on the fact that they have to be treated differently by the voting procedure.
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This happens often in group decision making when certain alternatives’ characteris-
tics such as age, qualification, gender, race may be given a certain weight. In other
cases society may also want to bias the collective decision process in favor of the
status quo because major changes in some fundamental aspects of the political life
should have a wide support. In several countries a qualified majority (or super-
majority) is asked in order modify the constitution; the French constitution can be
changed if the 60% of the non-abstaining deputies and senators approve it whereas
in India, a two-third majority is needed. Sometimes qualified majorities are part of
the legislative procedures in many parliaments. For example in the United States
Senate, a three-fifths majority is required to bring out a vote of cloture and avoid
obstruction.These examples show that the lack of Neutrality is not unattractive per
se. Clearly the choice of the weights to be attached to each alternative always in-
volves some degree of arbitrariness unless this is supported by a specific normative
analysis. This is beyond the scope of our paper.15
Houy (2007) [19] provides a characterization of the qualified majority rule when
voters have to choose between two alternatives16. This result can be thought as a
generalization of May’s theorem as simple majority voting is a particular case of
such a rule. Indeed, as for simple majority voting, these rule satisfies Universal Do-
main, Anonymity and Positive Responsiveness whereas it clearly violate Neutrality.
structure.
As in the previous section here we provide a conditional defense of qualified
scoring rules when many alternatives are available. That is, assume a society has
decided to use a balloting procedure that asks voters to assign some kind of score to
the available alternatives. Assume also that such a society does not give the same
weight to the alternatives. Then choosing the alternative with the highest weighted
sum of scores is the most compelling option. It is the most compelling option in the
sense that this aggregation procedure is the only one that satisfies, in our framework,
Houy’s conditions. The first three conditions used by Houy (2007) [19] are, again,
Universal Domain, Anonymity and Positive Responsiveness. The fourth condition,
asks to treat neutrally the alternatives only in the extreme case where all the voters
decide to abstain. This is a very mild requirement and it is logically implied by
Neutrality.
General Abstention. If v = v0 then W (v) = A.
As stressed already, Neutrality is a fairly strong axiom and plays an important
15Goodin and List (2006) [18] propose a possible way out from this further ethical puzzle: the
symmetrical special-majority. If no option receives the requisite special majority, then no option is
chosen.
16See also Masso´ and Vorsatz (2008) [22] for a characterization of weighted approval voting.
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role in Theorem 1. By relaxing it we lose the additive structure we are seeking as
it might be clear from this simple example that we have adapted from Houy (2007)
[19].
Consider only two alternatives and majority balloting. For each v ∈ V , compute
the total score vector s(v) = (sa1(v), sa2(v)). If one of the two alternatives receives
a strictly higher score than the other then it is the winner. Otherwise, if
a) v = v0 so that sa1(v) = sa2(v) = 0 then W (v) = (a1, a2)
b) sa1(v) = sa2(v) 6= 0. If sa1(v) is odd then a1 ∈W (v) and a2 /∈W (v).
c) sa1(v) = sa2(v) 6= 0. If sa1(v) is even then a1 /∈W (v) and a2 ∈W (v).
The example shows that it is possible to find an aggregation procedure that
satisfies Universal Domain, Anonymity, Positive Responsiveness and General Ab-
stention but still does not rely entirely on the sum of the scores (weighted or not)
to single out the winner of the election. In order to obtain this, Houy (2007) [19]
proposes a further condition. This condition focuses on a group of voters who decide
to cast one or more ballots with no name on it. If they decide to change their vote
in a certain manner they can affect the outcome of the election in a certain way.
They should be able to affect the outcome of the election in the same way if they
changed their vote in the same way and all the other voters were abstaining.
For any v ∈ V , let M ⊆ N be a subset of ballots in the vote distribution. Let
vM denote the vote distribution we obtain from v when none of the ballots in M
has a name on it and the rest of the ballots are as in v. Let finally vv\M denote
the vote distribution we obtain when the ballots in M are as in v while none of the
ballots in v\M has a name on it. Suppose that switching from vM to v alters the
outcome of the election, that is, W (vM ) 6= W (v).
Coalition Permanency. For all v, vM and vv\M ∈ V such that W (vM ) 6= W (v),
W (vv\M ) =
{
W (v)\W (vM ) if W (vM ) ⊂W (v);
W (v) otherwise.
Assume that at vM the ballots in a subset M have no name on it. Suppose the
voters who have cast those ballots decide to change and use those ballots in favor of
certain alternatives. This yields the vote distribution v. They can affect the result of
the election in two ways: first, they can enlarge the winning set (W (vM ) ⊂ W (v)).
Coalition Permanency requires that, in such a case, the alternatives which are added
to the winning set because of the votes contained in M should be the only ones to win
if all the ballots except those in M had no name on it (W (vv\M ) = W (v)\W (vM )).
Second, they can change the winning set without enlarging it. Coalition Permanency
requires that the winners at v should be the same as at vv\M .
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Before providing the final result we can provide a more rigorous definition of the
family of qualified scoring rules. The aggregation procedure W is a qualified scoring
rule if and only if for all aj , ak ∈ A there exists a strictly positive real number rjk,
with rkj =
1
rjk
, such that for all v ∈ V
aj ∈W (v) iff saj (v) ≥ rjksak(v) for all ak 6= aj .
It turns out that the five axioms listed so far characterize the whole family of
qualified scoring rules.
Theorem 2. An aggregation procedure satisfies Universal Domain, Ballot Anonymity,
Positive Responsiveness, General Abstention and Coalition Permanency if and only
if it is a qualified scoring rule.
It is simple to understand that any qualified scoring rule satisfies Universal
Domain, Anonymity, and Positive Responsiveness. Moreover, by definition it does
also satisfy General Abstention. Finally, any qualified scoring rule satisfies Coalition
Permanency because if a group of voters is able to change the outcome the election
by raising by a certain amount the scores given to certain alternatives (given the vote
of all the other members of the population), then these (marginal) scores alone would
lead to the victory of such alternatives if all the other members of the population
were abstaining. The proof of theorem 2 is quite involved and it is relegated to the
Appendix.
Concluding Comments
This work presents a novel rationale for scoring rules as it relates this family of
voting rules to the conditions of the celebrated May’s Theorem. We give particular
emphasis to the informational simplicity of scoring rules (or, to put it differently,
the amount of the information deriving from the balloting procedure they take into
account). This is described by a particular condition we impose on the aggregation
procedure, Ballot Anonymity, a condition that can be understood as follows. In our
framework voters are allowed to cast more than one ballot, each ballot standing for
one alternative. Ballot Anonymity requires the aggregation procedure to consider as
irrelevant the specific information about the particular combination of ballots cast
by each voter. It turns out that this condition is essential in characterizing scor-
ing rules together with the other conditions of May’s theorem: Universal Domain,
Positive Responsiveness and Neutrality. This result is also prone to an alternative
interpretation: Ballot Anonymity represents the divide between scoring rules and
aggregation procedures based on the pairwise comparison of alternatives. This pro-
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vides a better understanding of the informational foundations of both families of
rules.
As already stressed our work is closely related to Goodin and List (2006) [17].
The main difference between our contribution and theirs is that we formally dis-
entangle the different combinations of ballots a voter might choose (given by the
balloting procedure) from the input of the aggregation procedure (the collection of
ballots contained in the ballot box). This allows us to enlarge significantly the scope
of the axiomatization of the aggregation procedures. Indeed we are able to provide
the May-like conditions that characterize any scoring rule.
Our characterization is shown to be robust to situations where some normatively
admissible asymmetry between alternatives is considered. Readapting to our infor-
mational framework the conditions proposed by Houy (2007) [19] to characterize the
qualified majority rule (in the two-option case) we provide a full characterization of
qualified scoring rules.
Appendix - Aggregation procedures based on the pair-
wise comparisons of alternatives
In this section we provide a definition of some aggregation procedures based on the
pairwise comparisons of alternatives, the Condorcet rules. Usually such a compari-
son is based on the whole ranking over alternatives that is asked to each voter. We
adapt the procedures to our framework in the sense that the pairwise comparison
is based on the information that is made available by the balloting procedure. The
definitions are adaptations of those one can find in Fishburn (1977) [12] and Laslier
(1997) [20].
For each m ∈ N and ai ∈ A, let sm(ai, v) denote the score that voter m has
assigns to alternative ai at the vote distribution v ∈ V . In our framework this
amounts to count the number of ballots that this voter has cast in favor of alternative
ai. For all v ∈ V , and for any pair of alternatives ai, aj ∈ A, let p(ai, aj , v) be the
number of voters which assign a higher score to alternative ai than to alternative
aj , i.e.
p(ai, aj , v) = #{m ∈ N | vmi ≥ vmj}.
The pairwise comparison of the alternatives ai, aj ∈ A is based on such scores.
We say that ai is not defeated by aj at the profile v ∈ V , noted aiDvaj , if and only if
p(ai, aj , v) ≥ p(aj , ai, v) (alternatives ai and aj are tied at the pairwise comparison
if p(ai, aj , v) = p(aj , ai, v)).
Moreover, for all v ∈ V and ai ∈ A, we denote:
- b(ai, v) =
∑
aj∈A p(ai, aj , v);
- c(ai, v) = #{aj ∈ A : aiDvaj} −#{aj ∈ A : ajDvai};
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- d(ai, v) = number of voters in the largest subset from v for which ai ties or beats
every other alternatives on the basis of simple majority with respect to this subset.
If there is no such subset then d(ai, v) = 0;
- e(ai, v) = minaj∈A\{ai} p(ai, aj , v).
Black’s rule. For all v ∈ V , WB(v) = {ai ∈ A : ajDvai for no aj ∈ A} if the
latter set is nonempty. Otherwise W is determined by Borda count over the vote
distribution:
WB(v) = {ai ∈ A : b(ai, v) ≥ b(aj , v) for all aj ∈ A}.
Copeland’s Rule. For all v ∈ V , WCop(v) = {ai ∈ A : c(ai, v) ≥ c(aj , v)for allaj ∈
A}.
Young’s rule. For all v ∈ V and d(ai, v), let d∗(ai, v) = limn→∞ d(ai, nv)/n. Then
WY ou(v) = {ai ∈ A : d∗(ai, v) ≥ d∗(aj , v) for all aj ∈ A}.
Note that nV , for any integer n, stands for the fact the vote distribution v being
replicated n times.
Condorcet’s rule (or Minimax function) . For all v ∈ V ,
WCon(v) = {ai ∈ A : e(ai, v) ≥ e(aj , v) for all aj ∈ A}.
Kemeny’s rule. For all v ∈ V , let L∗ be the collection of ballots L that maximize∑
ai 6=aj s(ai, aj)L(ai, aj), where L(ai, aj) = 1 if b(ai, v) ≥ b(aj , v), and L(ai, aj) = 0
otherwise. Then
WKem(v) = {ai ∈ A : there is an L ∈ L∗ such that aiLaj for all aj ∈ A}.
Remark 1. Under Approval, Borda and Plurality Balloting, all the rules listed
here satisfy Universal Domain, Anonymity, Neutrality and Positive Responsiveness.
They all fail to satisfy Ballot Anonimity.
Appendix - Proof of Theorem 2
Let an aggregation procedure W satisfy all the listed conditions. The following
lemmata, together with Lemma 1 will be useful for the final proof. We define for
any strictly positive integer p, p/0 =∞
Lemma 3. Let an aggregation procedure W : V ⇒ A satisfy Universal Domain,
Positive Responsiveness and General Abstention. Then, for all aj , ak ∈ A and all
v ∈ V such that saj (v)sak (v) = 0, aj /∈W (v).
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Proof. For all v ∈ V let A0(v) = {aj ∈ A|saj (v) = 0}. Clearly at v0 ∈ V , |A0(v0)| =
|A|. By General Abstention, W (v0) = A. Let us consider all v1 ∈ V such that, for
one and only one alternative ak ∈ A, sak(v1) > 0 so that |A0(v1)| = |A| − 1. Let us
assume that, for some aj 6= ak, aj ∈ W (v1). By construction v1 {akaj} v0 so that,
by Positive Responsiveness, aj /∈W (v1), a contradiction.
Let us consider now a vote distribution vd ∈ V such that |A0(vd)| = |A|−d with
1 < d < |A|. Let us assume that, for some aj ∈ A0(vd), aj ∈W (vd). Take now some
alternative h ∈ A\A0(vd) and consider some vote distribution vd−1 ∈ V such that
sah(v
d−1) = 0 and sal(v
d−1) = sal(v
d) for all ah 6= al. By construction vd−1 {ajah}
vd since saj (v
d−1) ≥ saj (vd) = 0, 0 = sah(vd−1) < sah(vd) and sal(vd−1) = sal(vd)
for all al 6= aj , ah. Hence, by Positive Responsiveness aj ∈ W (vd−1). Iterating this
process leads to a vote distribution v1 in which for only one alternative ak (ak 6= aj),
sak(v
1) > 0 but still aj ∈W (v1), the desired contradiction.
Fix some alternative ak ∈ A. For each aj ∈ A let raj =
saj (v)
sak (v)
and r = {raj}aj∈A ∈
Q|A|. Finally let V r denote the family of vote distributions whose score ratios are
equal to r; i.e.,
V r = {v ∈ V | for all aj ∈ A,
saj (v)
sak(v)
= raj}.
Lemma 4. Let r = {raj}aj∈A ∈ Q|A|. There exists some v∗ ∈ V r such that, for all
v ∈ V r,
s(v) = (ra1 , ..., rak−1 , 1)msak(v
∗),
with m ∈ N+.
Proof. Let us pick some r = {raj}aj∈A with 0 < raj < ∞ for each aj ∈ A. Let
us consider the set V r = {v ∈ V | for all aj ∈ A, saj (v)sak (v) = raj}. Take the vote
distribution v∗ ∈ V r such that, for all v ∈ V r and for all aj ∈ A, saj (v∗) ≤ saj (v).
By construction s(v∗) = rsak(v
∗) so that, for all aj ∈ A, rajsak(v∗) is an integer.
Moreover for all m ∈ N+ and for all aj ∈ A, mrajsak(v∗) is still an integer so that
for all v ∈ V such that s(v) = ms(v∗), v ∈ V r.
Assume, by way of contradiction that there exists v1 ∈ V r and some strictly
positive m̂ ∈ R+ \ N+ such that s(v1) = m̂s(v∗). Let |m| be the greatest integer
such that |m| < m̂. This implies that 0 < m̂− |m| < 1. Take v2, v3 ∈ V such that
s(v2) = |m|s(v∗),
so that v2 ∈ V r and
s(v3) = s(v1)− s(v2).
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Hence, for each aj ∈ A,
saj (v
3) = saj (v
1)− saj (v2) = m̂saj (v∗)− |m|saj (v∗) = (m̂− |m|)saj (v∗) < saj (v∗)
(2)
and
saj (v
3)
sak(v
3)
=
(m̂− |m|)(saj (v∗))
(m̂− |m|)(sak(v∗))
= raj . (3)
From equation (3), v3 ∈ V r but this, in light of equation (2), contradicts the defi-
nition of v∗. For the case in which, for some aj ∈ A, either raj = 0 or raj =∞ the
same proof applies, we just have to restrict our attention to the alternatives such
that 0 < raj <∞.
Lemma 5. Let an aggregation procedure W : V ⇒ A satisfy Universal Domain,
Anonymity, Coalition Permanency and General Abstention. Then, for all v1, v2 ∈
V rb , W (v
1) = W (v2).
Proof. By lemma 1, for all v ∈ V , W (v) = T (s(v)). By lemma 4 there exists some
v′′ ∈ V rb such that for all v1 ∈ V rb , s(v1) = ms(v′′) where m ∈ N+. Assume that
T (s(v1)) 6= T (s(v′′)). If m = 1 we have a contradiction with Lemma 1. Let m > 1
so that
s(v1) = ms(v′′) = s(v′′) + (m− 1)s(v′′).
Within the rest of the proof, we work with the function T rather than with W , to
ease the presentation of the result. By slight abuse of notation, we use (m− j)s(v′′)
in order to refer to the vote distribution vj which score vector equals (m− j)s(v′′).
Since by assumption T (s(v1)) 6= T (s(v′′)) then, by Coalition Permanency
T ((m− 1)s(v′′)) =
{
T (ms(v′′))\T (s(v′′)) if T (s(v′′)) ⊂ T (ms(v′′)),
T (ms(v′′)) otherwise.
Suppose first that T (s(v′′)) 6⊂ T (ms(v′′)) so that T ((m − 1)s(v′′)) = T (ms(v′′)) 6=
T (s(v′′)). Again, by Coalition Permanency :
T ((m−2)s(v′′)) =
{
T ((m− 1)s(v′′))\T (s(v′′)) if T (s(v′′)) ⊂ T ((m− 1)s(v′′)),
T ((m− 1)s(v′′)) otherwise.
From the previous step, T ((m − 1)s(v′′)) = T (ms(v′′)) and T (s(v′′)) 6⊂ T (ms(v′′))
so that T ((m−2)s(v′′)) = T ((m−1)s(v′′)). Repeating the same argument we arrive
to
T (s(v′′)) = T (2s(v′′)) =, ...,= T (ms(v′′)) = T (s(v1)),
20
contradicting the assumption that T (s(v1)) 6= T (s(v′′)).
Suppose now that T (s(v′′)) ⊂ T (ms(v′′)) so that T ((m−1)s(v′′)) = T (ms(v′′))\T (s(v′′)).
From this it follows that T ((m− 1)s(v′′)) 6= T (s(v′′)). Hence, by Coalition Perma-
nency
T ((m−2)s(v′′)) =
{
T ((m− 1)s(v′′))\T (s(v′′)) if T (s(v′′)) ⊂ T ((m− 1)s(v′′)),
T ((m− 1)s(v′′)) otherwise.
From the first step we know that T ((m − 1)v′′) = T (ms(v′′))\T (s(v′′)) so that
T (s(v′′)) 6⊂ T ((m− 1)s(v′′)). Hence
T ((m− 2)s(v′′)) = T ((m− 1)s(v′′)) = T (ms(v′′))\T (s(v′′)).
Repeating the same argument we are again lead to
T (s(v′′)) = T (2s(v′′)) =, ...,= T (ms(v′′))\T (s(v′′)),
which yields the desired contradiction. Hence, we can write that for any v1 ∈ V rb
T (s(v′′)) = T (s(v1)).
For all v1, v2 ∈ V such that, for all ai ∈ A sai(v1) ≥ sai(v2), let v1− v2 ∈ V b denote
the vote distribution such that, for all ai ∈ A,
sai(v
1 − v2) = sai(v1)− sai(v2) ≥ 0.
Lemma 6. Let an aggregation procedure W : V ⇒ A satisfy Anonymity, Positive
Responsiveness, General Abstention and Coalition Permanency. Let v1, v2 ∈ V and
ai, aj ∈ A be such that ai, aj ∈ W (v1) ∩W (v2). Let moreover sai(v1) > sai(v2),
saj (v
1) > saj (v
2) and sak(v
1) = sak(v
2) for all ak 6= ai, aj. Then W (v1 − v2) =
{ai, aj}.
Proof. Let v1, v2 ∈ V denote a pair of vote distributions such that ai, aj ∈W (v1)∩
W (v2) for some ai, aj ∈ A. Furthermore, let sai(v1) > sai(v2), saj (v1) > saj (v2) and
sak(v
1) = sak(v
2) for all ak 6= ai, aj . Hence, the vote distribution v1 − v2 ∈ V b is
well-defined. Indeed, it satisfies sak(v
1−v2) = sak(v1)−sak(v2) = 0 for all ak 6= ai, aj
and that both sai(v
1−v2) and saj (v1−v2) are strictly positive. Furthermore, Lemma
3 implies that every alternative ak 6= ai, aj does not belong to W (v1 − v2); in other
words W (v1 − v2) ⊆ {ai, aj}.
Let us assume by contradiction that W (v1 − v2) ⊂ {ai, aj}. This implies that
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W (v1) 6= W (v1 − v2) so that by CP , we can write
W (v2) =
{
W (v1 − v2 + v2)\W (v1 − v2) = W (v1)\W (v1 − v2) if W (v1 − v2) ⊂W (v1),
W (v1 − v2 + v2) = W (v1) otherwise.
However, W (v1 − v2) ⊂ {ai, aj} ⊆ W (v1), then W (v2) = W (v1)\W (v1 − v2).
However, as by assumption W (v1 − v2) ⊂ {ai, aj}, previous equality implies that
either ai or aj does not belong to W (v
2), a contradiction.
Lemma 7. Let an aggregation procedure W : V ⇒ A satisfy Universal Domain,
Anonymity, Positive Responsiveness, General Abstention and Coalition Permanency.
For all v ∈ V \v0 and ai, aj ∈ A such that ai, aj ∈W (v), there is at most one r ∈ Q+
such that
sai (v)
saj (v)
= r.
Proof. Let
Rij = {r ∈ Q+ | ∃ v ∈ V s.t. sai(v)
saj (v)
= r and ai, aj ∈W (v)}.
Assume by contradiction that |Rij | ≥ 2. Let r+ = maxRij and r− = minRij , since
N is finite then r+ and r− are well defined. Moreover, by Lemma 3 r− > 0 and
r+ <∞. Let also
E+ = {v ∈ V | sai(v)
saj (v)
= r+ and ai, aj ∈W (v)}.
and
E− = {v ∈ V | sai(v)
saj (v)
= r− and ai, aj ∈W (v)}.
Finally let us take some vote distribution v1 ∈ E+ and v2 ∈ E− such that
sak(v
1) = sak(v
2) for all ak 6= ai, aj . If both E+ and E− are non-empty (other-
wise the claim is proved), it is always possible to find such two vectors. Indeed,
consider any v in E+. Take the vote distribution v1 such that sai(v
1) = sai(v),
saj (v
1) = saj (v) and sak(v
1) = 0 for all ak 6= ai, aj . By construction, we can write
v1 {aiah} v for each ah 6= ai, aj and v1 {ajah} v for each ah 6= ai, aj so that
Positive Responsiveness implies that v1 ∈ E+17. A similar argument applies to any
vote distribution v in E−. Again it suffices to take a vote distribution v2 ∈ E−
with sai(v
2) = sai(v), saj (v
2) = saj (v) and sak(v
2) = 0 for all ak 6= ai, aj . Clearly
17Positive Responsiveness does not directly imply it, even though it does it indirectly. One has
to define a sequence of intermediate vote distributions, in the spirit of the proof of Lemma 3. For
instance, take v′ with sai(v
′) = sai(v) for ai 6= ah and sah(v′) = 0. It is then immediate that,
by Positive Responsiveness, v′ ∈ E+. One has to iterate the same procedure on the different
alternatives to build the vote distribution v1.
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sak(v
1) = sak(v
2) for all ak 6= ai, aj so that v1 and v2 exist.
We have that by assumption
sai (v
1)
saj (v
1)
= r+ > r− = sai (v
2)
saj (v
2)
so that the following
cases arise:
1 - sai(v
1) > sai(v
2) and saj (v
1) ≤ saj (v2) (or sai(v1) ≥ sai(v2) and saj (v1) <
saj (v
2)). This yields a contradiction with Positive Responsiveness as by definition
v1 {aiaj} v2 implying that aj 6∈W (v2).
2 - sai(v
1) ≤ sai(v2) and saj (v1) ≥ saj (v2). This yields a contradiction with the
assumption that r− < r+.
3 - sai(v
1) < sai(v
2) and saj (v
1) < saj (v
2). In this case, the vote distribution v2−v1
can be defined. By Lemma 6, we know that W (v2 − v1) = {ai, aj}. However, one
can prove that sai(v
2− v1)/saj (v2− v1) < r− which entails a contradiction with the
definition of r−.
4 - sai(v
1) > sai(v
2) and saj (v
1) > saj (v
2). In this case, the vote distribution v1−v2
can be defined. By Lemma 6, we know that W (v1 − v2) = {ai, aj}. However, one
can prove that sai(v
1− v2)/saj (v1− v2) > r+ which entails a contradiction with the
definition of r+.
Lemma 8. Let an aggregation procedure W : V ⇒ A satisfy Universal Domain,
Anonymity, Positive Responsiveness, General Abstention and Coalition Permanency.
For all v1, v2 ∈ V \v0 such that sai (v1)
saj (v
1)
>
sai (v
2)
saj (v
2)
for some couple of alternatives
ai, aj ∈ A
ai ∈W (v2) =⇒ aj 6∈W (v1) and aj ∈W (v1) =⇒ ai 6∈W (v2).
Proof. Let v1, v2 ∈ V \v0 and ai, aj ∈ A be such that sai (v
1)
saj (v
1)
>
sai (v
2)
saj (v
2)
. We only prove
the first part of the statement, ai ∈ W (v2) =⇒ aj 6∈ W (v1). A similar argument
proves that aj ∈ W (v1) =⇒ ai 6∈ W (v2). Assume for the sake of contradiction that
ai ∈W (v2) =⇒ aj ∈W (v1).
Let
Rj = {r ∈ Q+ | ∃ v ∈ V s.t. sai(v)
saj (v)
= r and aj ∈W (v)},
and
Ri = {r ∈ Q+ | ∃ v ∈ V s.t. sai(v)
saj (v)
= r and ai ∈W (v)}.
Let r+ = maxRj and r− = minRi. Since N is finite, both r+ and r− are well defined
and, by Lemma 3, r+ <∞ and r− > 0. Moreover, by assumption, sai (v1)
saj (v
1)
≤ r+ and
sai (v
2)
saj (v
2)
≥ r− so that r+ > r−. Let also
F+ = {v ∈ V | sai(v)
saj (v)
= r+ and aj ∈W (v)}.
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and
F− = {v ∈ V | sai(v)
saj (v)
= r− and ai ∈W (v)}.
Let us take v̂1 ∈ F+ and v̂2 ∈ F− such that sak(v̂1) = sak(v̂2) for all ak 6= ai, aj .
An argument similar to the one used in the proof of lemma 7 proves that two such
vectors always exist.
We can now consider the following cases:
1 - sai(v̂
1) > sai(v̂
2) and saj (v̂
1) ≤ saj (v̂2) (or sai(v̂1) ≥ sai(v̂2) and saj (v̂1) <
saj (v̂
2)). This yields a contradiction with Positive Responsiveness as by definition
v̂1 {aiaj} v̂2 implying that aj 6∈W (v̂2).
2 - sai(v̂
1) ≤ sai(v̂2) and saj (v̂1) ≥ saj (v̂2). This yields a contradiction with the
assumption that r− < r+.
3 - sai(v̂
1) < sai(v̂
2) and saj (v̂
1) < saj (v̂
2). In this case, the vote distribution v̂2− v̂1
can be defined. Using an argument similar to that used to prove lemma 6, we can
show that ai ∈W (v2−v1). However, one can prove that sai(v̂2− v̂1)/saj (v̂2− v̂1) <
r− which entails a contradiction with the definition of r−.
4 - sai(v̂
1) > sai(v̂
2) and saj (v̂
1) > saj (v̂
2). In this case, the vote distribution v̂1− v̂2
can be defined. Using an argument similar to that used to prove lemma 6, we can
show that aj ∈W (v̂1− v̂2). However, one can prove that sai(v̂1− v̂2)/saj (v̂1− v̂2) >
r+ which entails a contradiction with the definition of r+.
Lemma 9. Let an aggregation procedure W : V ⇒ A satisfy Universal Domain,
Anonymity, Positive Responsiveness, General Abstention and Coalition Permanency.
For all v1, v2 ∈ V \v0 such that sai (v1)
saj (v
1)
≥ sai (v2)
saj (v
2)
for any aj 6= ai,
ai ∈W (v2) =⇒ ai ∈W (v1).
Proof. Take first any two vote distributions v1 and v2 with v1, v2 ∈ V \v0, and
sai (v
1)
saj (v
1)
>
sai (v
2)
saj (v
2)
for any aj 6= ai. Hence, whenever ai ∈ W (v2), by Lemma 8,
aj 6∈W (v1) so that, as W (v1) 6= ∅, we have that W (v1) = {ai} as desired.
Let us now take any two vote distributions v1 and v2 with
sai (v
1)
sah (v
1)
=
sai (v
2)
sah (v
2)
= m
for some ah ∈ A and some m ∈ Q+, and sai (v
1)
saj (v
1)
>
sai (v
2)
saj (v
2)
for any aj 6= ai, ah.
W.l.o.g. we assume that ai = a1 and ah = a2.
Let us assume first that m = 0. Hence, both sa1(v
1) and sa1(v
2) must be equal
to zero, so that for all aj 6= a1, a2, sa1 (v
2)
saj (v
2)
=
sa1 (v
1)
saj (v
1)
= 0, a contradiction.
Let us now assume that 0 < m <∞. The vote distribution v1 leads, by Lemma
5, to the same outcome as the vote distribution u1 with score vector
s(u1) = s(v1)sa2(v
2) = (msa2(v
1)sa2(v
2), sa2(v
1)sa2(v
2), sa3(v
1)sa2(v
2), . . . , sak(v
1)sa2(v
2)).
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Similarly, the vote distribution v2 leads to the same outcome as the vote distribution
u2 with score vector
s(u2) = s(v2)sa2(v
1) = (msa2(v
2)sa2(v
1), sa2(v
2)sa2(v
1), sa3(v
2)sa2(v
1), . . . , sak(v
2)sa2(v
1)).
By assumption, for all aj 6= a1, a2, sa1 (v
1)
saj (v
1)
>
sa1 (v
2)
saj (v
2)
, so that
sa1 (u
1)
saj (u
1)
>
sa1 (u
2)
saj (u
2)
for all
aj 6= a1, a2 which amounts to say
msa2(v
1)sa2(v
2)
saj (v
1)sa2(v
2)
>
msa2(v
2)sa2(v
1)
saj (v
2)sa2(v
1)
for all aj 6= a1, a2,
which is equivalent to
saj (v
2)sa2(v
1) > saj (v
1)sa2(v
2) for all aj 6= a1, a2,
which ultimately implies that saj (u
2) > saj (u
1) for all aj 6= a1, a2.
Consider finally the vote distribution u3 which generates the following score
vector:
sa3(u
3) = sa3(u
1),
and
saj (u
3) = saj (u
2) for any aj 6= a3.
This entails that, by construction, u3 {a1a3} u2 as sa1(u3) = sa1(u2), sa3(u3) =
sa3(u
1) < sa3(u
2) and saj (u
3) = saj (u
2) for all aj 6= a1, a3.
Iterating the process for the k−3 remaining alternatives we have u1 = uk {a1ak}
uk−1 {a1ak−1} . . . {a1a5} u4 {a1a4} u3 {a1a3} u2. Hence, by Positive Re-
sponsiveness, whenever ai ∈ W (u2), we have that ai ∈ W (u1). As by definition
W (v1) = W (u1) and W (v2) = W (u2), we can write that whenever ai ∈ W (v1), we
have that ai ∈W (v2), as desired.
The case in which m =∞ remains to be considered. However, the case is quite
similar to the previous one with the feature that both sa2(v
1) and sa2(v
2) must be
equal to zero. Hence the score vectors of u1 and u2 satisfy s(u1) = sa1(v
2)s(v1) and
s(u2) = sa1(v
1)s(v2).
In order to finish the proof, one has to consider the cases in which, for some two
vote distributions v1 and v2 with
sai (v
2)
sah (v
2)
=
sa1 (v
1)
sah (v
1)
= mh for several alternatives ah.
However, the logic in the proofs remains true almost verbatim.
In what follows we show that the proof of theorem 2 is built on the previous
lemmata.
1- If v = 0 then, by General Abstention, W (v) = A.
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2- For all v ∈ V , let rih ∈ Q+ denote the ratio such that sai(v) = rihsah(v) for all
ah ∈ A. By lemmata 5 and 7, there exists one and only one rij ∈ Q+, 0 < rij <∞,
such that sai(v) = rijsaj (v) for all ai, aj ∈ A such that both ai, aj ∈W (v) for some
v ∈ V \ v0.
Given that ai ∈ W (v), Lemma 9 implies that, for all v′ ∈ V with sai(v′) ≥
rihsah(v
′) for all ah 6= ai, ai ∈ W (v′). Moreover, by the uniqueness of raiaj , aj 6∈
W (v′) whenever sai(v′) > rijsaj (v′). Similarly, for all v′ with sai(v′) < rijsaj (v′).
Lemma 8 implies that, as aj ∈ W (v), ai 6∈ W (v′). Notice that this reasoning also
determines the family of vote distributions at which any subset of alternatives are
in the winning set.
3- Consider all ai, aj ∈ A such that there does not exist any v ∈ V in which they
both belong to the winning set, i.e. no v for which ai, aj ∈W (v). Let then
Rˆi = {r ∈ Q+ | ∃ v ∈ V s.t. sai(v)
saj (v)
= r and ai ∈W (v)}
and
Rˆj = {r ∈ Q+ | ∃ v ∈ V s.t. sai(v)
saj (v)
= r and aj ∈W (v)}
Notice that, by assumption, Rˆj ∩ Rˆi = ∅. Moreover, by lemma 3 both Rˆj and Rˆi
are not empty and, since N is finite, they are also finite. Let rj = max Rˆj and
ri = min Rˆi. Again by Lemma 3 rj <∞ and ri > 0.
Assume by contradiction that rj ≥ ri. By lemma 5, rj 6= ri since, Rˆj ∩ Rˆi = ∅.
So we are left with the case rj > ri. Let v̂1 and v̂2 ∈ V be such that sai (v̂1)
saj (v̂
1)
= rj and
aj ∈W (v̂1)j whilst ai /∈W (v̂1) and sai (v̂
2)
saj (v̂
2)
= ri and ai ∈W (v̂2) whilst aj /∈W (v̂2).
By assumption we have
sai (v̂
1)
saj (v̂
1)
>
sai (v̂
2)
saj (v̂
2)
which entails, by lemma 8 that aj /∈W (v̂1),
the desired contradiction.
Let us set r ∈ R+ such that rj < r < ri. Let us take any v′ ∈ V such that either
ai ∈W (v′) or aj ∈W (v′) so that sai (v
′)
saj (v
′) ∈ Rˆj ∪ Rˆi. If moreover
sai (v
′)
saj (v
′) > r then, by
definition
sai (v
′)
saj (v
′) > r
j so that necessarily ai ∈ W (v′). If, conversely, sai (v
′)
saj (v
′) < r < r
i
so that aj ∈W (v′).
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